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THE COMING OF AGE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACTS
Jeffrey T. Renz*
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) was the
precursor to a series of similar state environmental policy acts (SEPA)
enacted during the environmental decade of the 1970's. NEPA combined a
procedural requirement that federal agencies prepare environmental
impact statements on their proposed major actions significantly affecting
the environment with a directive that these agencies "consider" the
environmental impacts of their proposals. Twenty-four states now have
similar requirements for preparation of environmental impact state-
ments,2 for substantive application of environmental laws,3 or for limited
environmental reviews.4
In many cases the express language of these state environmental
policy acts differs from that of NEPA. Additionally, several recent federal
court decisions have severely limited the scope of NEPA and its effect on
agency decision-making.5 As a result, state environmental policy acts are
now construed more broadly and applied more stringently than NEPA.
State courts tend to require environmental impact statements in situations
where federal courts would not and scrutinize the contents of those
* Partner in the law firm of Patten & Renz specializing in Environmental Law; B.A., Montana,
1971; J.D., Montana, 1979.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976).
2. California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (as amended
1983); Connecticut Environmental Policy Actof 1973, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-l to -7 (1981);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 343-1 to -8 (1980 Supp.); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (1981);
Maryland Environmental Policy Act of 1973,.MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 1-301 to 305 (1974, as
amended); Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 30 §8 62-62H (1981 as
amended); Minnesota Environmental Policy Act of 1973, MINN. STAT. ANN. 18 16D.01-.07 (as
amended, 1981); Montana Environmental Policy Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to 324 (1983);
New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to0l 17
(McKinney Supp. 1982) North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971, N.C. GEN.' STAT. §§
I 13A-I to-10 (1978); PublicPolicy Environmental Act, P.R. LAws ANN. 12 §§ 1121-42 (1978);South
Dakota Environmental Policy Act, S.D. CODE ANN. §§ 34A-9-1 to-13 (1977); Virginia Environmental
Quality Act, VA. CODE, §§ 10-177 to 186 (1982 Supp.); Washington State Environmental Policy Act,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 43.21C.010 to .910 (1981); Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act of 1971,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (1982).
3. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-
1207 (1982 Supp.); Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. Ch- 116B (1981).
4. Arizona Fish and Game Policy Memorandum, July 1, 1971; DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 7-7001 to
7005 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 95A-101 to 1306a (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 278.025 (1981); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to 69 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 321.640 -.770 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
13:19-7(g); 27:23-23.4 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-8(b)(1981).
5. See, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Corp. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1979).
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statements more closely. In addition, those courts apply the SEPA
requirements for circulation of and comments to an EIS more strictly.
Finally, the majority of state courts have required state and local agencies
to abide by the substantive policies as well as the procedural requirements
of their state acts. Since 1969, NEPA, and federal cases interpreting it,
have served as the source of persuasive authority in state cases interpreting
and applying SEPA.8 Since the late 1970's a large body of state law,
interpreting and applying state environmental policy acts, has developed.
This article analyzes the body of state case law that has arisen as a result of
the interpretation and application of state environmental policy acts.
I. THE EIS PROCESS AND COMMON REQUIREMENTS OF STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACTS
All state environmental policy acts require, to varying degrees,
preparation of a statement or report (EIS) describing the environmental
impacts of a proposal, alternatives to the proposal, and unavoidable
adverse environmental effects.
The EIS process follows a common scheme. First, a proposal surfaces
which calls for action by a governmental body. Under the requirements of a
SEPA, the governmental body determines if the action falls within the
purview of the SEPA. It then determines if the environmental effects of the
proposal, if any, are significant. If so, the agency prepares a draft and a
final EIS, and, finally, reaches a decision on the proposal. This process
serves as the framework to analyze and compare the requirements of
various SEPA's in the following discussion.
Three points of analysis are necessary in any discussion of the SEPA
schemes. The first point is found in the question: when must an EIS be
prepared? This comprises several subquestions: (1) Who, among the
categories of state agencies, local governments, quasi-governmental bod-
ies, and private entities, must prepare an EIS? (2) What constitutes a
major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment? (3)
What must an agency do before it determines that an EIS is or is not
necessary? The second point lies in the requirements for the contents of the
EIS. Stated differently, when is an EIS "adequate"? The third point is,
how are decision-makers required to treat an EIS once it is prepared?
The following analysis will also comment upon the standard of review
which state courts apply to each of these steps and consider specific
provisions in state environmental policy acts and other state laws which
6. Village Laguna of Laguna Beach, Inc. v. Bd. of Sup'v'rs., 134 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 41,44 (1982); Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., 184 Mont. 127, 137,602 P.2d 147 (1979); Wis. Envtl.
Decade v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 98 Wis. 2d 682, 298 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1980).
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affect their operation.
II. WHEN MUST AN EIS BE PREPARED?
A. Who Must Prepare an EIS?
The express provisions of the SEPA determine who must prepare an
EIS. As a general rule, EISs must be prepared by state agencies. New
York,8 Hawaii,9 Massachusetts,10 California,"1 and Washington1 2 extend
this requirement to local governments and quasi-governmenfal bodies.13
Minnesota requires all governmental bodies14 and, when government
action is not involved, private entities,1 5 to prepare EIS's on their major
actions.
Commonly, more than one agency may have jurisdiction over a
proposal. In such cases, only one agency is required to prepare an EIS. The
"lead agency" designation is determined by statute, by regulation, by
agreement, or by prior court decisions.18
B. What is a "Major Action"?
As a general rule, any discretionary action17 which may culminate in
physical changes 8 to the environment is a "major action" under state
environmental p61icy acts. The sole exception to this rule is found in the
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-lb(b) (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-10.3 (2)(1981); MD.
NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 1-304 (1974); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
113A-4 (1978); S.D. CODE ANN. § 34A-9-1(1)(1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (1982); see, Robinson
v. Kunach, 76 Wis. 2d 436, 251 N.W.2d 449, 454 (1977) (counties are not "agencies of the state").
8. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105 (2,3).
9. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 343-1 (3) (1980 Supp.).
10. MAss. ANN. LAWS Ch. 30 § 62 (1981).
11. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21063 (1977).
12. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.030 (1981).
13. See also, South Brunswick Twp. v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 129 N.J. Super. 126,322 A.2d 478
(1974) (turnpike authority); Shawn v. Golden Gate Bridge, 60 Cal. App. 3d 699, 131 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1976) (trafisportation district).
14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.04 (1981).
15. Id.
16. People ex rel Younger v. LAFCO, 81 Cal. App. 3d 464, 146 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1978) (1st
agency to act); Citizens Task Force on Sohiov. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 23 Cal. 3d 812,591 P.2d 1236,
1237 (1979) (per curiam); Bozung v. LAFCO of Ventura County, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017
(1975) (Ist agency to act); cf,Sierra Clubv. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 114 Misc. 2d 52, 450
N.Y.S.2d 677 (1982) (by designation); CAL. PUB. RE. CODE § 21067.
17. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1973) (en bane); Eastlake
Comm. Counc. v. Roanoke Assoc., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36, 49 (1973).
18. Fullerton Joint Union H.S. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 32 Cal. 3d 779, 654 P.2d 168,177-79
(1982) (en banc); Board of Visitors, Marcy Psychiatric Center v. Coughlin, 465 N.Y.S.2d 124 (N.Y.
Sup.) revd on other grounds, 60 N.Y. 2d 14, 466 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1983).
34 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
Maryland Environmental Policy Act. 19 That Act expressly limits "ac-
tions" to "requests for legislative appropriations or other legislative
actions .. ."o The scope of the general rule becomes clear when we
examine its various applications.
Discretionary v. Ministerial Acts. Discretionary actions trigger a
SEPA; ministerial actions do not. A series of cases illustrate this principle.
In New York Chapter of the Appalachian Mountain Club v. Flacke,2" the
New York Department of Transportation (DOT) was involved in planning
and construction of the Westway highway project. A substantial portion of
the highway was to be constructed on filled tidal (or littoral) wetlands.
Rather than go through complicated procedures leading to a state wetlands
permit, the DOT petitioned the Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion to declare 200 acres of the wetlands to be a non-littoral zone. The DEC,
without preparing an EIS, "demapped" the 200 acre parcel.
Under the DEC's regulations, areas where water depth exceeded six
feet were not included in a littoral zone. Other areas could be determined to
be littoral, based upon the application of various subjective criteria. In its
review, the court determined that 150 acres of the contested area lay under
more than six feet of water and thus the subjective criteria did not apply to
these parcels. The court reasoned that, since the DEC's application of the
objective standard of a six-foot depth involved no exercise of discretion, it
was not an action to which New York's environmental policy act applied.22
As to the remaining 50 acres, the court held that these qualified for
subjective review. Because such a subjective review involved an exercise of
discretion it was a major action.2" The court thus directed the DEC to
determine if an EIS was required.
A similar case was Coon Creek Watershed District v. State Environ-
mental Quality Board," where the court found that repair of a county
ditch was statutorily mandated (and therefore ministerial) but disagreed
with the contention that the project was therefore exempt from the
Environmental Policy Act. The Court determined,
The requirement of an EIS does not preclude the repair but
merely insures that the environmental effects will be considered
and that the repair will be done in the least harmful way. 5
In effect the Court held that even if the decision to repair was ministerial,
the manner in which the repair was to be done. Therefore an EIS was
19. MD. CODE ANN. § 1-301(c) (1974).
20. Id.; Mayor and City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 378 A.2d 1326, 1328 (1977).
21. 109 Misc. 2d 514, 440 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1980).
22. 440 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
23. Id.
24. 315 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1982).
25. Id. at 605.
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required to aid the agency in identifying and avoiding adverse environmen-
tal effects.
In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Wisconsin's Environ-
mental Decade v. Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Rela-
tions,2" held that the defendant's granting of a permit after an objective
application of fixed standards for sewage holding tanks involved no
exercise of discretion, and required no EIS.27
The troubling aspect of this distinction is its potential for abuse. For
example, an industry may apply for a discharge permit for its effluent, an
activity which can clearly have a significant effect upon the environment. If
the applicant establishes that the effluent stream meets all fixed discharge
standards, the permitting agency may plead that it has no discretion, and
avoid all consideration of the impacts of the effluent on the receiving
waters.
The trend, however, is to apply SEPA to "ministerial" actions. At
least one court has held that the SEPA itself injects discretion into the
agency's decision-making process. In Juanita Bay Valley Community
Association v. Kirkland,28 the Washington Appeals Court held
The change in the substantive law brought about by SEPA
introduces an"element of discretion into the making of decisions
that were formerly ministerial, such that even if we assume,
arguendo, that the issuance of a grading permit was, prior to
SEPA a ministerial, non-discretionary act, SEPA makes it
legislative and discretionary.29
The Washington Court of Appeals simply stated the Coon Creek rule
in a different'way. Its reasoning is persuasive. A SEPA, at a minimum,
requires an agency to consider environmental factors. That consideration,
and the agency's determination of how to deal with significant impacts, is
discretionary. Theagency must, therefore, always consider environmental
factors and, when "consideration" identifies potential significant effects, it
must prepare an EIS, albeit its decision is "ministerial."
Permitting. Private applicants have argued, unsuccessfully, that an
agency is not required to undertake an environmental review of private
actions where the agency's action consists only of granting a permit. The
leading case on this issue is Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors
26. 104 Wis. 2d 640, 312 N.W.2d 749 (1981).
27. The Court may also have been swayed by the fact that the Department processed 12,000
similar applications annually. See also, Holtz & Krause, Inc. v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 85 Wis. 2d 198,270
N.W.2d 409 (1978) (regulatory activities to protect the environment not subject to an EIS).
28. 9 Wash. App. 59,510 P.2d 1140,1149 (1973); cf. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.
2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1978) (SEPA creates authority to deny permit).
29. Id. at 1149. This decision was ratified by the Washington Supreme Court in Polygon Corp. v.
City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1978).
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of Mono County.30 There, a developer applied for a special use permit to
develop a series of condominiums. The California Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, looked to the legislative intent expressed in California's CEQA. It
found that the intent of the act was to afford fullest possible protection to
the environments ' and thus, the Act's definition of a "project" (or action)
covered a wide range of activities, including the permitting of private
activities. 2 Courts in other states have either reached the same result 33 or
have considered, without comment, cases in which a permit was at issue.34
A distinctly anomalous decision in this area is Montana Wilderness
Association v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences. 5 In this
case, the Montana Department of Health was asked to issue a certificate
"lifting sanitary restrictions" on the proposed Beaver Creek subdivision, a
prerequisite to development. The Department prepared an EIS, whose
adequacy was immediately challenged, and approved the water, sewer, and
solid waste aspects of development. The Supreme Court, over a strong
dissent, held that the Department was not required to prepare an EIS
because the majority of the regulatory functions had been committed by
law to local government.386
Timing. The timing of the action in relation to the entire proposal can
be important when determining whether SEPA applies to the action. The
critical question is whether the action itself will, or is a step in a process
which will, culminate in physical changes to the environment. For
example, condemnation which merely results in change of title to land is
not necessarily a major action, 7 unless it is a prelude to development.
Similarly, while a proposal to merely annex land may not trigger the
environmental policy act, an annexation proposal leading to change in the
land's use does.38
30. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049 (1972) (en banc).
31. 502 P.2d at 1056.
32. Id. at 1054.
33. In Re Environmental Management Commission, 53 N.C. App. 135, 280 S.E.2d 520, 526
(1981); State v. Lake Lawrence Public Lands Protective Ass'n, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494,497
(1979) (en banc); Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 184 Conn. 51, 441 A.2d 68, 78 (1981).
34. Northeast Solite Corporation v. Flacke, 124 Misc. 2d 313, 451 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1982);
P.E.E.R. v. Minn. Env. Qual. Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978).
35. 171 Mont. 477, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976) (hereinafter, "Beaver Creek I1").
36. 559 P.2d at 1161.
37. In Re Petition of Gray's Harbor, 30 Wash. App. 855, 638 P.2d 633, 639 (1982); Indiana
State Highway Comm'nv. Ziliak, 428 N.E.2d 275,279 (Ind. App. 1981) (express exemption in Act.);
State v. Williams & Hessee, 53 N.C.App. 674 281 S.E.2d 721 (1981).
38. City of Santa Clara v. Santa Clara County LAFCO, 139 Cal. App. 3d 923, 189 Cal. Rptr.
112 (1983); Pistoresi v. City of Madera, 138 Cal. App. 3d 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1982); People ex rel.
Younger v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 464, 146 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1978); see
also, Fullerton Joint Union, 654 P.2d at 179-80 (new school district); Board of Visitors, 465 N.Y.S.2d
at 128 (conversion of mental hospital); Programming and Systems, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban
[Vol. 5
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Miscellaneous "Actions". Most state environmental policy acts
expressly include proposals for legislation as "major actions." One court,
however, has held that general legislation, in that case a proposed
ordinance regulating siting of dumps, is not the kind of action requiring an
EIS.3 9 As a rule, legislative actions on specific proposals such as zoning
changes,40 annexation,41 or the sale of land 2 are "major actions."
Likewise, ratemaking for public utilities is a "major action" which
may require an EIS.43 Finally, an agency's decision not to undertake a
project, when that decision will not alter the physical environment, is not a
"major action.'
Conclusion. Generally, state environmental policy acts are applied
more broadly than NEPA and encompass nearly all governmental activi-
ties. However, simply because an activity qualifies as a "major action" does
not necessarily mean an EIS is required. The action must also have
potential significant environmental effects.
III. WHAT ARE "SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS"?
A. Introduction
As we noted, an EIS must be prepared for a major action when it may
have significant environmental effects. As a rule, if there is a possibility
that a project will have significant effects on the environment, state courts
have required an EIS. Similarly, where the effects on the environment are
of doubtful significance, state courts have resolved the doubt in favor of
preparing an EIS. Thus state courts require EIS where federal courts
would not.' 5
Development Corp., 93 App. Div. 2d 733,461 N.Y.S.2d 279,280 (1983); Town of Yorktown v. N.Y.
State Department of Mental Hygiene, 92 App. Div. 2d 897, 459 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1983).
39. Niagara Recycling, Inc. v. Town Board of Town of Niagara, 83 A.D.2d 335,443 N.Y.S.2d
951 (1981).
40. Starbird v. San Benito County, 122 Cal. App. 3d 657, 176 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1981).
41. See, supra note 39.
42. Devittv. Heimbach, 109 Misc. 2d 463,440N.Y.S.2d465,470 (1981), affd, 58 N.Y.2d925,
447 N.E.2d 59, 460 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1983).
43. W.E.D. 1,79 Wis. 2d 409,256 N.W.2d 149 (1977); but see, W.E.D. 11, 105 Wis. 2d 457,313
N.W.2d 863 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(2) (1983).
44. City of National City v. State, 140 Cal. App. 3d 598, 189 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1983)
45. Compare, Coon Creek Watershed District v. State Environmental Quality Board, 315
N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1982), (8.2 mile ditch repair), with Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex.
1974) (no significant impacts in 11 mile channelization project); compare, In Re City of White Bear
Lake, 311 Minn. 146, 247 N.W.2d 901 (1978), with Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973)
(pier); compare, W.E.D. 1, 79 Wis. 2d 409, 256 N.W.2d 149 (1977), with Morrisville v. Delaware
River Basin Comm'n, 399 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (ratemaking).See, Manchester Environmen-
tal Coalition v. Stockton, 184 Conn. 51,441 A.2d 68,78 (1981) (SEPA threshold lower than NEPA.);
Tehan v. Scrivani, 468 N.Y.S.2d 402, 405 (N.Y. Supp. 1983) (low threshold); Life of the Land v.
1984]
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B. When Does A Major Action Significantly Affect The
Environment?
Although a proposal may be a "major action," an EIS is called for only
if it significantly affects or may significantly affect the environment. This
threshold determination has been the subject of much litigation. State
courts have considered where the line between significance and non-
significance should be drawn and, as discussed in the next section, how an
agency must go about drawing the line.
In determining when significant effects come into play, we must first
look to the express language and the stated policy of the various state
environmental policy acts. This language falls into two classes. Some
SEPA's require an EIS for actions significantly affecting the environ-
ment.4 . Others seem to employ a lower threshold, requiring an EIS for
actions which may or could significantly affect the environment.4 7 These
express terms make little practical difference. When the Act's language is
applied to a given "major action," the SEPA's policy dictates that all
doubts be resolved in favor of preparing an EIS.
The California Environmental Quality Act contains the lowest
threshold requirement for preparation of an EIS. The California Public
Resources Code, 48 defines "significant effect on the environment" as "a
substantial or potentially substantial adverse change in the environment."
The California Supreme Court applied this requirement in No Oil, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles.4 After reviewing the Act's policy statement,50 the
court held that an EIS must be prepared:
whenever it can be fairly argued on the basis of substantial
evidence that the project may have significant environmental
impact.51
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the standard set forth by the
trial court: that the project must have an important or momentous effect of
semipermanent duration.52 As a result, California agencies now prepare an
EIS whenever there is substantial evidence in the record that a project may
Ariyoshi, 53 Hawaii 156, 163, 577 P.2d 1116, 1121 (1978) (SEPA requires more information);
H.O.M.E.S. v. N.Y. State Urban Development Corp., 69 App. Div. 2d 222, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832
(1979) (SEPA threshold is lower); Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc. v. Flacke, 81 App. Div. 2d 1022,
440 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (1981).
46. These include Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin. See supra note 2.
47. These include California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, South Dakota and New York. See
supra note 2.
48. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21068.
49. 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66 (1974) (en banc).
50. 529 P.2d at 76.
51. Id. at 70.
52. Id. at 76. This was based in part on the CEQA's policy statement.
[Vol. 5
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have significant environmental effects.5"
Several other states employ a statutory* threshold lower than
NEPA's." , Connecticut considers actions to be significant if they "could
have a major impact"55 or if they "could serve short term to the
disadvantage of long term goals."58 This standard was applied in
Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton,57 where the court held
that an EIS is "required whenever the project will arguably damage the
environment." 58 Massachusetts requires an EIS for actions which "may"
result in damage to the environment.59 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
holds that "the threshold of potential environmental damage to warrant an
impact statement under MEPA is minimal."60 New York, too, employs a
"low threshold," 61 requiring an EIS when an action may "fairly be said" to
have significant impacts.62
The language of the remaining State Environmental Policy Acts
appear, through their omission of "may," to require a higher threshold
determination. 3 In practice, there is little difference between these two
express standards. For example, North Carolina courts hold that where
substantial evidence shows potential adverse environmental effects, signifi-
cant effects are shown." Similarly, Wisconsin courts hold that where
issues of arguably significant environmental impacts are raised, the agency
53. Id. at 77. See also, Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward, 106 Cal. App. 3d 988 (1980);
Brentwood Ass'n for No Drilling, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 184 Cal. Rptr. 664,134 Cal. App. 3d 491
(1982).
54. See generally supra note 46.
55. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-Ic (1981).
56. Id.
57. See supra note 33.
58. Id.
59. MAss. ANN. LAws Ch. 30 § 62A (1981).
60. Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 755, 323
N.E.2d 329, 338 (1975).
61. Tehan v. Scrivani, 468 N.Y.S.2d 402, 405 (N.Y. Sup. 1983).
62. H.O.M.E.S. v. N.Y. Urban Development Corp., 69 App. Div. 2d 222,418 N.Y.S.2d 827,
832 (1979); Schweiss v. Ambach, 115 Misc. 390, 454 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262-63 (1982).
63. The Minnesota Environmental Policy Act requires an EIS, whenever "there is potential for
significant environmental effects." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.04 (1983 Supp.). The import of this
standard is not clear. On one hand the Minnesota Supreme Court has allowed "substantial
compliance" with MEPA, forgiving the absence of an EIS. No Power Line, Inc. v. Minnesota
Environmental Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 326 (Minn. 1977). On the other, it has required an
EIS for the repair of an 8 mile long county ditch. Coon Creek Watershed District v. State Env. Qual.
Bd., 315 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1982). The Minnesota Court's "substantial compliance" rule is clearly
out of linewith the majority rule of strict, literal compliance. This may be resolved as Minnesota has yet
to squarely face a dispute in which no environmental study was prepared. (In No Power Line,
environmental impacts were addressed under the state's facility siting act).
64. In Re Environmental Management Comm'n, 53 N.C. App. 135, 280 S.E.2d 520, 526
(1981).
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is required to justify any finding of no significant impact.65 Washington's
Supreme Court also sets a low threshold,"" requiring an EIS for an action
"when there is a reasonable probability that it will have more than a
moderate effect on the quality of the environment. 67 At first blush, this
standard appears higher than the "arguable damage" rule of other
jurisdictions. Washington, however, requires primafacie compliance with
its SEPA for all major actions before the agency decides whether to
prepare an EIS.68 Hawaii applies similar standards.6 9
C. Procedural Prerequisites to Determinations That A Major
Action Will Have No Significant Impacts
The state or local government agency must determine if an EIS is
required for any proposal.70 State courts subject these determinations to
strict scrutiny. No matter what standard of review was employed by the
particular state court, it has held that the agency's determination must
satisfy a number of criteria before it will pass muster.
The first requirement is that of a reviewable record. 71 The record must
be in writing,7 and sufficient to allow the court to review it and determine if
the agency considered environmental factors. 3 Second, the record must
show that the agency identified areas of environmental concern.74 This
means the agency must, at a minimum, conduct an independent study of
the proposal. Agency determinations simply concluding that there are no
areas of environmental concern, without showing in the record that the
agency undertook a valid, good faith effort to identify them, are
65. W.E.D. 1, 79 Wis. 2d 409, 256 N.W.2d 149, 157 (1977).
66. Washington's State Environmental Policy Act is identical to the Montana Environmental
Policy Act. Montana has yet to determine when environmental impacts are "significant." Cf., Kadillak
v. Anaconda Co., 184 Mont. 127, 602 P.2d 147 (1979).
67. Norway Hill Prot. Ass'n. v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267,275,552 P.2d 674,679
(1976); Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976); Sisley v. San Juan County, 89
Wash. 2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977) (en banc); see, Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. Tacoma, 84
Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974).
68. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wash. 2d 870,613 P.2d 1164,1169 (1980) (en banc);
Gardner v. Pierce County Bd. of Comm'rs, 27 Wash. App. 2d 241, 617 P.2d 743, 746 (1980); Sisley,
supra, 569 P.2d at 716; Juanita Bay Valley Comm. Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59,510 P.2d 1140,
1149 (1973).
69. Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Ass'n v. Cobb, 63 Hawaii 453, 629 P.2d 1134 (1981).
70. Hayden, 613 P.2d at 1169; Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 576 P.2d 54,59
(1981).
71. Lassila, 576 P.2d at 60; W.E.D. 1, 256 N.W.2d at 155.
72. NoOil, Inc.v. Cityof LosAngeles, 13 Cal. 3d68,529 P.2d66,74(1974) (enbanc); Friends
of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 247,502 P.2d 1049, 1064-65 (1972) (en
banc); Tehan, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 406. But see, Hayden, 613 P.2d at 1170.
73. Gardner, 617 P.2d at 746; Sisley, 569 P.2d at 717; W.E.D. 1, 256 N.W.2d at 155
74. W.E.D. 1, 256 N.W.2d at 155-56; Kanaleyv. Brennan, 465 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (N.Y. Sup.
1983).
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overturned. 5
The agency must then study the environmental concerns it identifies,
as well as those brought to its attention,7 6 and, on the basis of facts elicited
in its studies, reach a determination as to whether the environmental
impact is "significant.""
The leading New York decision is Schenectady Chemicals, Inc. v.
Flacke,7 8 in which the New York Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion had decided that no significant impacts would result from the
operation of a sand and gravel mining operation. When a controversy arose
over the gravel pit's potential impact on an underlying aquifer, the DEC
assigned its geologist to study the potential impacts. The geologist
concluded that the aquifer would not be affected and the DEC did not
change its determination. The appellate court reversed. It found that the
geologist had conducted his review under the state's Mined Land Reclama-
tion Law, whose requirements were more narrow than New York's SEPA.
The case was remanded to the DEC for a "hard look" under the "broader
requirements" of the environmental policy act.
California, under the CEQA, requires a "threshold study" of environ-
mental impacts.80 The study must be in writing,81 must identify potential
environmental impacts, and must set out written statements of supporting
facts upon which the agency bases its determination. 2
Washington courts expressly require primafacie compliance with its
State Environmental Policy Act. s In Juanita Bay Valley Community
Association v. Kirkland, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the
Washington State Environmental Policy Act' necessarily required con-
75. Noel v. Cole, 98 Wash. 2d 375,655 P.2d 245 (1982) (en banc); Soule v. Town ofColonie, 464
N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y. Sup. 1983); Devitt v. Heimbach, 58 N.Y.2d 925,447 N.E.2d 59,460 N.Y.S.2d
512 (1983); County of Freebourn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 243 N.W.2d 316 (1976) (action under
Minn. Env't'l Rights Act); cf., Schenectady Chemicals, Inc. v. Flacke, 83 App. Div. 2d 460, 446
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1982).
76. W.E.D. 1, 256 N.W.2d at 155-57, Kanaley, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 133; Schenectady Chemicals,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 419-20.
77. A number of cases require a "hard look." The "hard look" is a fuzzy standard. What
constitutes a "hard look" will vary from judge to judge. A better rule is a requirement of strict
compliance which requires an agency to consider, at a minimum, on the record, the criteria set out in the
SEPA, all possible environmental impacts, and to make findings with regard to each.
78. Supra, note 75.
79. See also, Kanaley, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 133; Soule, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
80. Fullerton Joint Union H.S. Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 32 Cal. 3d 779,654 P.2d 168, 177-98
(1982) (en banc); Pistoresi v. City of Madera, 138 Cal. App. 3d 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1982).
81. No Oil Inc., 529 P.2d at 70.
82. Friends of Mammoth, 502 P.2d at 1064-65, cf W.E.D. 1, 256 N.W.2d at 155-56; Lassila,
576 P.2d at 59-60.
83. Hayden, 613 P.2d at 1169; Sisley, 569 P.2d at 716; Norway Hill, 552 P.2d at 679; Lassila,
576 P.2d at 59-60; Juanita Bay, 510 P.2d at 1149.
84. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21 C.030(2)(c).
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sideration of environmental factors by the decision-making body before it
could determine whether or not an EIS must be prepared.8 5 This was
followed by the Washington Supreme Court in Norway Hill Preservation
Association v. King County Council.8 That court held that the SEPA
policies of full disclosure and consideration of environmental values
required an agency to actually consider environmental factors before it
might determine that a proposal has no significant impacts. 1 It is clear that
in all cases the agency must actually consider environmental factors in
advance, whether an EIS is prepared or not.88 Thus, the tendency among
other state courts, although unstated, is to require primafacie compliance
with the state environmental policy act before the agency makes a
threshold determination. 9
The final requirement is that the agency base its determination of
whether an EIS is necessary on written statements of supporting facts.0°
Thus, where agencies "found" no significant impacts but failed to
substantiate their "findings" 91 and where agencies were apprised of, but
failed to look at environmental impacts,9" their decisions were overturned.
Courts apply various standards of review when addressing these
requirements, ranging from de novo9s review to a "clearly erroneous"
standard.94 When these cases are compared it is apparent that the standard
of review has little meaning. The courts usually examine the entire record
and determine, on the facts in the record, whether the requirements of the
SEPA have been satisfied. This means that on occasion the court
substitutes its interpretation of SEPA for the agency's. 95 The agency's
85. 510 P.2d at 1147.
86. Supra, note 67.
87. 552 P.2d at 679.
88. Gardner, 617 P.2d at 746; Juanita Bay, supra note 28.
89. See, supra notes 75-82; Kanaley, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
90. Gardner, 617 P.2d at 746; Lassila, 576 P.2d at 60; Friends of Mammoth, 502 P.2d at 1064-
65; W.E.D. 1. 256 N.W.2d at 155-56.
91. Lassila. supra, note 83.
92. Kanaley. supra note 74; H.O.M.E.S., supra note 62.
93. Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 755, 323 N.E.2d 329, 340
(1975); City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 364 Mass. 639, 308 N.E.2d 488, 503 (1974).
These decisions were based on the Supreme Judicial Court's determination that health and life were at
stake and that health and life were areas historically committed to judicial determination, therefore the
court should conduct a de novo review.
94. Hayden, 613 P.2d at 1170; Sisley, 569 P.2d at 717. See, Brentwood Association,, 184 Cal.
Rptr. at 669 (standard of review is substantial evidence of significant effects.); Kanaley, 465 N.Y.S.2d
at 134 (arbitrary and capricious); Board of Visitors v. Coughlin, 60 N.Y.2d 14,466 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671
(1983) (arbitrary and capricious); Soule, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (arbitrary and capricious, abuse of
discretion, and not in accordance with law).
95. Sisley, 569 P.2d at 715-16; Norway Hill, 552 P.2d at 679. This is proper, as it is the Court's
role to apply the law to the facts in the record. See, Noel v. Cole, 98 Wash. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245, 248
(1982) (en banc), where the Washington Supreme Court held that, until an agency satisfies SEPA, its
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determination is generally upheld when it satisfies the criteria set out above
and is consistent with the facts in the record."
This raises another issue often encountered at this stage of SEPA:
When should the Court consider evidence of environmental impacts not
raised before the agency? On one hand, SEPA call for full disclosure
during the decision-making process and invite input from the public, from
experts, and from sister agencies.9 This policy towards full disclosure
likewise applies to any relevant information that can be presented at the
adjudicatory (or appeal) stage of the process (i.e. in the courthouse). On
the other, a plaintiff should not be allowed to "sandbag" the agency by
waiting until the parties are in court to present new environmental impacts.
The competing requirements of administrative law and state environ-
mental policy acts call for a flexible approach to this question. Where the
agency's action is unannounced and unnoticed, affected parties ought to
have the opportunity to raise environmental impacts before the court. If
they are clearly significant, the court should require an EIS. If they are not
clearly significant the matter should be returned to the agency for further
consideration. The duty of identifying and addressing potential impacts
lies not with the public, but with the agency." For this reason, a party who
does not participate in the agency's proceedings should also be permitted to
challenge the agency's finding of no significant impact on the grounds that
the agency failed to consider obvious impacts. This is true even where the
party declined the opportunity to participate. A party otherwise should be
permitted to raise new impacts before the court where it shows good cause.
No matter what rule is applied for standing, no matter what standard
of review is applied, and no matter what the depth and scope of the agency's
review, if a proposal will significantly affect the environment, an EIS is
likely to be required.
IV. CONTENTS OF THE EIS
The specific subjects which the agency must discuss are set out in the
statute. Generally, these track the requirements of NEPA and call for a
detailed discussion of:
(1) The environmental impacts of the proposal;
(2) any adverse environmental affects which cannot be avoided if
actions are ultra vires.
96. See, supra notes 71-91. Cohalen v. Carey, 88 App. Div. 2d 77, 452 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641
(1982). In many cases, agency decisions are affirmed simply because the complainant has failed to
establish that there were environmental impacts which the agency failed to address. Perley v. County of
Calavaras, 137 Cal. App. 3d 424,187 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1982); CohalenSoule, 464 N.YS.2d at 579-80;
Minnesota P.I.R.G. v. Minnesota Env. Qual. Council, 306 Minn. 370, 237 N.W.2d 375 (1975).
97. For the policy behind this, see the discussion at notes 119 to 126.
98. W.E.D. I, 256 N.W.2d at 160.
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the proposal is implemented;
(3) alternatives to the proposed action;
(4) the relationship between local short-term uses of the environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity;
and
(5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved if the proposal was implemented.
Some states require less;9 some require more."0° If required, these
subjects must be discussed in the EIS.
Agencies satisfy the EIS requirements by preparing a draft EIS,
circulating the draft among sister agencies and the public, and by receiving
comments to it. A final EIS (FEIS) is then prepared. The FEIS may
include changes to the draft made necessary by new information received
in comments or developed by the agency. It must include comments to the
draft and the agency's responses to the comments. The FEIS then serves as
the environmental document on which the agency bases its decision to
proceed or not to proceed with a proposal. At this stage, disputes most often
arise over the adequacy of the contents of the EIS and over the manner in
which the agency prepared it.
The general test of the adequacy of the EIS is "whether the
environmental effects of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives
are sufficiently disclosed, discussed [sic] and that they are substantiated by
supportive opinion and data."10' Some courts have applied what is referred
to as a "rule of reason" to the discussion in the EIS.' 0 ' The rule of reason is,
at best, an inadequate label. At worst, it has permitted agencies to escape
the requirements of state environmental policy acts. The general test of
"sufficiently disclosed, discussed, and substantiated" may be applied more
objectively.
The thickness of the EIS should not be an indicator of its adequacy. If
a voluminous document fails to discuss some impacts of a proposal, or
otherwise fails to fulfill the Act's requirements of a detailed discussion, it is
99. Hawaii limits the contents of its EIS's to discussions of the impacts of a proposal and of its
alternatives. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 343-2(9) (1982 Supp.).
100. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-1 b(b) (description of the proposal). CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
21100 (mitigation measures; growth inducing impacts); MD. ANN. CODE § 1-304 (mitigation
measures); S.D. CODE ANN. § 34A-9-7 (mitigation measures, growth-inducing aspects); N.C. STAT.
ANN. § 113A-4(2)(c) (mitigation measures).
101. Ullock v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wash. App. 573,565 P.2d 1179,1184(1977), citing Leschi
v. Highway Comm'n, 84 Wash. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974).
102. Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 53 Hawaii 156,577 P.2d 1116, 1121 (1978); Barrie v. Kitsap
County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148, 1155 (1980); Orange County v. North Carolina Dept. of
Trans., 46 N.C. App. 350,265 S.E.2d 890,912 (1980); Village Laguna of Laguna Beach, Inc. v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 134 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1029, 185 Cal. Rptr. 41,44 (1982); Coalition Against Lincoln
West, Inc. v. City of New York, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. Sup. 1983); W.E.D. 1, 298 N.W.2d at 208.
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insufficient. Nevertheless, the EIS need not be perfect.103 The EIS must
simply discuss. and analyze the topics set'out in the Act in detail and it must
back up the discussion with facts and data. The studies which generate the
data need not be attached to the EIS; but the EIS must refer to them. EIS
which contained inaccurate or misleading representations have been
condemned. 104
The EIS must be prepared as early as possible in the decision-making
process,10 5 so that the decision-maker has adequate time to review the
information in the EIS before it considers and acts on a proposal."" Along
this line an environmental study done pursuant to another statute does not
necessarily satisfy the SEPA requirements.0 7
The EIS must discuss more than just the impacts of the agency's
action. If the agency's action applies only to a portion of a larger project or
to a phase of the project, the environmental impacts of the entire proposal
must be considered and discussed.10 8 Cumulative impacts of interrelated
projects must also be considered.109 An EIS must compare the proposal
with the existing environment. For example, where a planning board
proposed to amend its general plan, its EIS comparing relative impacts
under the original plan and under the amended plan was found to be
inadequate. 10
Generally, courts approve an EIS where matters asserted by com-
103. San Francisco Ecology Center v. City and County of San Francisco, 48 Cal. App. 3d 584,
122 Cal. Rptr. 100, 106 (1975).
104. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App. Id 1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 479, 483-85
(1981).
105. City of Glens Falls v. Board of Education, 88 App. Div. 2d 233, 453 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894
(1982).
106. Devitt v. Heimbach, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 512-13;Tri County Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of
Queensbury, 55 N.Y.2d 41, 432 N.E.2d 592, 447 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (1982). In another series of
decisions, New York and California courts have required agencies to prepare an EIS in advance of
referenda and bond issue elections. The courts note that, in such cases, the electorate is the decision-
maker and must, therefore, be apprised of the information in the EIS. Tn County Taxpayers Ass'n, 447
N.Y.S.2d at 701; Fullerton Joint Umon H.S. Dist., 654 P.2d at 180.
107. In Re Environmental Management Comm'n, 280 S.E.2d at 526. Contra, No Power Line.
Inc., 202 N.W.2d at 327, which permits "substantial compliance" with MEPA. This case appears to be
an anomaly. Compare, P.E.E.R. v. Minnesota Env. Qual. Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978); cf.
Rural Land Owners Ass'n v. Lodi City Council, 143 Cal. App. 3d 1013,192 Cal. Rptr. 325,329 (1983)
("harmless error" standard was improper).
108. Juanita Bay, 510 P.2d at 1149.
109. Rural Land Owners Ass'n, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 332; ef. Onondaga Landfill Systems, 440
N.Y.S. at 789; See also, Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Dept. of Nat. Resources, 94 Wis.
2d 263, 288 N.W.2d 168 (1979), where the court approved a sewer project which, after being divided
into two parts, did not trigger the SEPA, despite what the dissent refers to as a "rather transparent
subterfuge." Id. at 179.
110. Environmental Planning and Information Council of Western El Dorado County, Inc. v.
County of El Dorado, 131 Cal. App. 3d 350, 182 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320-21 (1982).
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plainants to be inadequate are nonetheless discussed."1 But where readily
apparent impacts or obvious alternatives are omitted, the matter will be
sent back to the agency.
112
As mentioned above, the EIS must describe reasonable alternatives
and discuss their impacts. This discussion need not be exhaustive. The
agency is not required to address infeasible alternatives. Where it has
described a range of alternatives, the agency is not required to discuss every
possible alternative within that range."s [he discussion, however, is not
limited to alternatives similar to the proposed project. Rather, the agency is
required to identify the objective the proposal is intended to achieve and
discuss the alternatives which will achieve it." 4 In doing so the agency is
not limited to alternatives within its expertise." 5 Finally, it must discuss
the impacts of a "no project" alternative." 6
State environmental policy acts require agencies to consider and
develop alternatives to a proposal even where no EIS is required."7 Like
the EIS requirement, the study of alternatives must be thorough, but not
exhaustive, and it must be in writing.""
The agency is required to circulate its EIS among sister agencies and
the public. Although the EIS is in part an informational document,"19 the
circulation requirement is more than just formal. Circulation serves as a
check on any institutional bias within the agency. 120 The lead agency's
11l. Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v. Pub. Service. Comm., 98 Wis. 2d 682, 298 N.W.2d
205, 208 (1980).
112. El Dorado Union H.S. District v. City of Placerville, 144 Cal. App. 3d 123, 192 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1983); County of Jnyo, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84; cf. Webster Associates v. Town of Webster, 59
N.Y.2d 220,464 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1983). (Ommission of alternative not fatal as all persons were aware of
it.) The Montana case of State ex rel. Montana Wilderness Association v. Bd. of Natural Resources, 39
St. Rptr. 1238, 648 P.2d 734 (Mont. 1982) is distinctly out of line with this rule. Despite the Board's
admission that it failed to adequately discuss alternatives in its EIS on a transmission line proposal, and
the Court's findings that reasonable and obvious alternatives had not been discussed, the Supreme
Court approved the project on the rationale that the EIS was not "grossly insufficient as a matter of
law." 648 P.2d at 744.
113. E.D.F., Inc. v. Flacke, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. Sup. 1983); N.R.D.C. v. City of New York,
112 Misc. 2d 106, 446 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (1982).
114. Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148, 1155-56 (1980). Again,
compare, State ex rel. M.W.A., 648 P.2d at 742.
115. See, N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
116. County ofInyo, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84. In error is State ex rel. M. W.A., 648 P.2d at 745.
117. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-10-3(2)(d)(1981); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § I-
303(2) (1974); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(l)(b)(iv) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
43.21C.030(2)(e) (1981); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 1.1 1(2)(e) (1982).
118. W.E.D. 1, 79 Wis. 2d 161,255 N.W.2d 917,925-26 (1977). Again, Stateex reL M. W.A. is
in error. 648 P.2d at 743 (Defendant claimed no legal mandate required studies of alternatives).
119. Twain Harte Homeowners v. County of Tuolumne, 138 Cal. App. 3d 664, 188 Cal. Rptr.
233, 239-40 (1982).
120. Glen Head-Glenwood Landing Civic Council, Inc. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 88 App. Div. 2d
484, 453 N.Y.S.2d 732, 739 (1982); W.E.D. 1, 256 N.W.2d at 155.
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perceptions of the project and of its mission often differ altogether from
those of the reviewing agency. Thus, an agency whose mission it is to
develop water resources may view impacts differently from the agency
whose mission is to protect and enhance fish habitat. Circulation ensures
that the EIS reflects the range of opinion among local, state, and federal
agencies.
Circulation also provides an independent opportunity for experts and
agencies with expertise the circulating agency may lack, to identify
additional environmental impacts, additional alternatives, and defects in
the draft EIS.' 2 ' It provides a forum for opposing opinions and data.1 22 The
EIS may be the only vehicle by which the agency may tap a reservoir of
outside expertise.' 2
The agency must include the comments it receives, and its responses to
them, in the final EIS. These comments must be demonstrably available to
the decision-making body. 124 Where comments to the EIS raise new
concerns or set out conflicting opinions and data, the agency must engage in
a good-faith, reasoned analysis of the new information . 25 Agencies
generally satisfy this requirement by setting written comments and the
agency's response side by side in a separate section. A "good-faith,
reasoned analysis" means more than simply acknowledging a comment,
however. The agency must go so far as to show that it has considered and
weighed the arguments for the point in the comment. Where a point is
rejected, the agency must set out valid reasons for rejecting it. When a
comment is valid, the agency must demonstrate that the EIS has been
corrected or clarified.
Occasionally, comments will raise significant new problems or present
significant new information. When significant information is received, it is
incumbent upon the agency to circulate the new information, either as a
supplement to the draft EIS or as a revised draft EIS, for further comment.
This fulfills the EIS's dual role as an "alarm bell, 1 26 warning the public
and governmental officials about the impacts of a project before it is
undertaken, and as a magnet, attracting new information, opposing points
of view and information and advice on how to mitigate identified impacts.
State and federal courts tend to be divided on when the agency must
circulate new information. State courts tend to require supplements or
121. Glen Head, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
122. Id.
123. Rye Town, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 71; cf., Barrie, 613 P.2d at 1157.
124. Rural Land Owners Ass'n, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
125. Twain Harte Homeowners, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 240; Rural Land Owners Ass'n, 192 Cal.
Rptr. at 33 1; San Francisco Ecology Center, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 108;H.O.M.E.S., 418 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
126. Board of Visitors, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 128; Town of Henrietta v. Dept. of Environmental
Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (1980).
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revised EIS's where new impacts are identified,1 27 new alternatives are
considered, 2 ' or new, conflicting information is presented. 12 9 Federal
courts err on the side of expediting a project. 30
The leading case on this requirement is P.E.E.R. v. Minnesota
Environmental Quality Council,'3' in which the defendant, after prepar-
ing a draft EIS, conducted extensive hearings on proposed transmission
line corridors. During the hearing process, an alternative route was added.
The alternative was mentioned, but not discussed in detail, in the final EIS.
The new alternative was adopted. The Minnesota Supreme Court held the
final EIS to be inadequate for failure to discuss, circulate, and receive
comments on the new alternative.3 2
In Sutter Sensible Planning, Inc. v. Sutter County Board of Supervi-
sors,133 the California Court of Appeals held that comments are an integral
part of an EIS. The court found a revised final EIS inadequate even though
the revision corrected inadequacies in the original EIS because the revised
version was never circulated for comment.
State courts look extensively to the legislative policy of the SEPA
when reviewing the contents of the EIS and the procedures the agency
followed in preparing and circulating it. SEPA policies which call for "full
consideration" of environmental effects and the directives that environ-
mental impacts be considered "to the fullest extent possible" require strict,
literal compliance with the Act. Nevertheless, if a complainant is unable to
establish that there are impacts or alternatives which have not been
addressed in the EIS, a court will approve the document.
By calling for strict, literal compliance with the terms and policies of
their state environmental policy acts, state courts have done more than just
implement them. As the New York Supreme Court noted, a gray
requirement of "substantial compliance" would give rise to numerous
lawsuits as parties argued over what was or was not substantial. Literal
enforcement renders judicial review more objective, more standardized,
more consistent, and promotes the policies of the state environmental
127. Glen Head, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
128. P.E.E.R. v. Minn. Env. Qual. Council, 266 N.W.2d 858,863 (Minn. 1978); Envtl. Council
of Sacramento v. Bd. of Supervisors of Sacramento County, 135 Cal. App. 3d 428, 185 Cal. Rptr. 363,
365 (1982).
129. Barrie v. Kitsap County Boundary Review Board, 97 Wash. 2d 212, 643 P.2d 433, 435
(1982) (en banc); Sutter Sensible Planning, Inc. v. Sutter County Board of Supervisors, 122 Cal. App.
3d 813, 176 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344-47 (1981); but see, Environmental Law Fund, Inc. v. City of
Watsonville, 124 Cal. App. 3d 711, 177 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1981).
130. See, Atchison, T. and S.F. Ry. Co. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
131. Supra note 128.
132. Id., 266 N.W.2d at 863-71.
133. Supra note 129.
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policy act. 34
V. SUBSTANCE V. PROCEDURE
When the United States Supreme Court decided Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council v. Karlen,135 and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation v. N.R.D.C.,136 it removed virtually all substance from the
National Environmental Policy Act.13 7 In so doing, it veered from the
majority rule in state courts.
The SEPA policies of encouraging "productive and enjoyable har-
mony between man and his environment,"138 of promoting "efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment,"139 of stimulating
"the health and welfare of man,"14 and of fostering the general welfare 41
are carried out only when agencies are required to carry them out. The
mere preparation of a descriptive document fails to do this.
State courts, as a rule, have pointed to these policy statements and
recognized their importance in carrying out the intent of their various
legislatures. They have differed from the federal courts, which have
incorrectly treated similar policy statements in NEPA42 as mere national
goals, 43 and have required their state agencies to obey the substantive, as
well as the procedural, requirements of their acts.
The question of the substantive application of a SEPA arises after an
adequate EIS has been prepared and circulated. Those who argue that
environmental policy acts are purely procedural claim that by merely
preparing, circulating and reviewing an EIS, an agency satisfies the acts'
134. Rye Town, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 70-71.
135. 444 U.S. 223 (1979).
136. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
137. Stryckers' Bay reversed a Second Circuit decision in which the Court of Appeals had
ordered the Department of H.U.D. to render a decision which satisfied substantive requirements of
NEPA. The Supreme Court noted that, in Vermont Yankee, it had held that "NEPA, while
establishing 'significant substantive goals for the Nation,' imposes upon agencies duties that are
'essentially procedural.'" Id. at 227.
138. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-la (1981); HAWAII REy. STAT. § 344-3 (1980 Supp.); IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-10-2 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.01 (a) (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-
102 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-2 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.010(I) (1981).
139. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 11 6D.01(b); MONT. CODE ANN. §75-1-102; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.21C.010(2);
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.01 (b); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-102; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.21C.010(3).
141. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-le(a); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 344-3(1); IND. CODE ANN. §
13-1-10-2; MD. ANN. CODE § 1-302(b); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-103(l); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
43.216.020(I)(a).
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (1976)
143. Compare Strykers' Bay, 444 U.S. at 227, with 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
MON, § 56.02 (1973); Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 69 Wis. 2d 1, 230
N.W.2d 243, 251-52 (1975) (WEPA's preamble is a declaration of legislative intent).
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requirements that the agency consider environmental impacts. 144 The
proponents of the acts' substantive application argue that this is not
enough. The agency, they claim, must act to mitigate environmental
impacts, where possible, or in some cases refuse a permit (or scrap a
proposal) for a project which will damage the environment. In all cases the
agency should adopt the least environmentally damaging alternative. The
majority rule among state courts is that the agency must comply with both
the procedural directives and the substantive policies of state environmen-
tal policy acts.
A number of state environmental policy acts expressly require some
kind of mitigation of impacts identified in the EIS. 45 When a SEPA
expressly requires mitigation of impacts, the agency is required to make
express finding with regard to mitigation. That is, the agency must either
identify and discuss measures which will eliminate, avoid, minimize, or
reduce environmental impacts, 146 identify alternatives in which the im-
pacts are minimized or avoided, 147 or find that mitigation measures are
infeasible. 4 The agency's findings must, of course, be supported by
substantial evidence in the record.' 49 "Partial" mitigation will fail to
satisfy the SEPA when it requires the agency to avoid or minimize impacts
or state reasons why avoidance or minimization is not feasible.150 In short,
the significant impacts of a project must be mitigated, a least damaging
alternative must be chosen, or the agency must state why such measures
are infeasible.
Among these, Minnesota has the strictest requirement. In In re City
of White Bear Lake,'5' the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a trial
court holding which had directed the Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources to issue a permit for the least environmentally damaging
alternative identified in an EIS. The Supreme Court noted that the
Department had found that there was no feasible alternative which would
144. This is the thrust of Vermont Yankee and Stryckers" Bay.
145. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21081; N.Y. ENVT'L CONSERV. LAW, § 8-0109(1); Town of
Henrietta v. Dept. of Env't'l Conservation, 76 App. Div. 2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 444-49 (1980);
Glen Head, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 737; Rural Land Owners Ass'n, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
146. Id.
147. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081; Town of Henrietta, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 447; Twain Harte
Home Owners, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40; Stevens v. City of Glendale, 125 Cal. App. 3d 986, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 367, 371 (1981); Village of Laguna, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
148. City of Del Mar v. City of San Diego, 133 Cal. App. 3d 401, 183 Cal. Rptr. 898,907-08
(1982); Coalition Against Lincoln-West, Inc. v. City of New York, 465 N.Y.S.2d 170, 176 (N.Y. Sup.
1983); Town of Henrietta, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 447-49; Environmental Council of Sacramento, 185 Cal.
Rptr. at 368; Town of Candor v. Flacke, 82 App. Div. 2d 951, 440 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770 (1981).
149. Rural Land Owners Ass'n, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
150. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21081 (1983); MASS. GEN. STAT. § 61 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
116D.04(6) (1981); S.D. CODE ANN. § 34-9-10 (1977); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109.
151. 311 Minn. 146, 247 N.W.2d 901 (1976).
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not cause environmental damage. It held that, under the Minnesota
Environmental Policy Act, economic considerations alone could not justify
environmentally damaging projects and that the Department was, there-
fore, required to deny a permit.152
California and New York have similar express requirements for
mitigation. In Twain Harte Homeowners v. County of Tuolomne,'53 the
California Court of Appeals held that the CEQA required the County to
set forth the reasons why the value of a proposed development outweighed
its environmental impacts. An earlier case, Stevens v. City of Glendale,"s
established the rule that the City was required to outline specific social,
physical, and economic reasons why alternatives which minimized envi-
ronmental impacts could not be implemented.
The New York Supreme Court followed a similar tack in Town of
Henrietta v. Department of Environmental Conservation.5 5 The Court
upheld a permit which imposed 18 protective conditions upon a develop-
ment. The Court held that the SEQRA required an agency to formulate its
decision on the basis of the adverse environmental impacts identified in the
EIS.156 It held, too, that the SEQRA also required the agency to make
written findings that it has imposed conditions necessary to minimize or
avoid adverse environmental effects identified by the EIS." 7
Although other state acts lack the express requirements found in the
New York and California acts, those courts which have considered this
issue follow the majority rule. In the leading case of Polygon Corporation
v. City of Seattle, 58 the Washington Supreme Court, after reviewing the
policies of SEPA, 59 rejected arguments that the Act was purely
procedural:
Such a reading of SEPA would thwart the policies it establishes
and would render the provision that "environmental amenities
and values will be given appropriate consideration in decision
making" a nullity.'6 0
The court noted further that "full" consideration of environmental values
impells substantive authority in the Act.'6 '
152. Id., 247 N.W.2d at 906-07.
153. 138 Cal. App. 3d 664, 188 Cal Rptr. 233, 239-40 (1982).
154. 125 Cal. App. 3d 986, 178 Cal. Rptr. 367, 371 (1981).
155. 76 App. Div. 2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 447-49 (1980).
156. Id. at 446.
157. Id. at 447.
158. 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
159. As we noted above, the Montana Environmental Policy Act is identical to the Washington
State Environmental Policy Act.
160. 578 P.2d at 13J2.
161. Id. See also, State v. Lake Lawrence Public Lands Protective Ass'n, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 601
P.2d 494, 497 (1979) (en banc) (counties have independent authority, under SEPA, to deny permits);
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In an earlier case,'62 Washington's Court of Appeals noted:
if a particular government action were to result in severe
environmental consequences and there were no other important
beneficial consequences against which to balance them, the
courts would be warranted in holding the action to be either ultra
vires or arbitrary and capricious and violative of the substantive
policies of SEPA.6 3
Finally, one year after Vermont Yarkee, the Washington Supreme
Court reaffirmed the substantive role of the Washington SEPA in
ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition,'"6 holding that it was not only the
substantive policy of SEPA to prevent environmental degradation but,
where possible, to reverse damage already done. 6"
Other state courts have yet to directly confront the issue of procedural
v. substantive authority,' 6 but the reasoning of the Washington Supreme
Court, as well as the New York and California courts, is persuasive. Unless
the state environmental policy act is given substantive effect, it directs
nothing more than a paper-shuffling exercise. The Act is a mechanism for
public input into the decision. If the public input can be ignored, this
function is frustrated. If the Acts' policies are not applied, then they are
meaningless. 6 7
VI. CONCLUSION
State courts should be expected to continue to follow the trend of
requiring agencies to show prima facie consideration of environmental
factors in all cases, of requiring EIS where federal courts do not, and of
giving SEPA substantive effect. There appear to be two reasons behind
such stricter application of SEPA.
First, early cases interpreting SEPA looked to existing federal cases
for guidance. This pre-Vermont Yankee body of federal law tended to
enforce NEPA more strictly than do federal courts today. Later state
Juanita Bay, 510 P.2d at 1149 (SEPA renders ministerial decisions discretionary).
162. Ullock v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wash. App. 573, 565 P.2d 1179 (1977).
163. 565 P.2d at 1186.
164. 92 Wash. 2d 685, 601 P.2d 501 (1979).
165. 601 P.2d at 515.
166. See also, Eastlake Comm. Council v. East Roanoke Assoc., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475,513 P.2d
36, 49 (1973). Cf. W.E.D. 1., 256 N.W.2d at 153 (dictum).
167. State courts have yet to determine the effects of constitutional provisions mandating
environmental protection upon the application of their state environmental policy acts. A Montana
trial court considered this issue and held that Montana's environmental provisions, MONT. CONST. art.
II § 3 and art. IX (1972), mandate substantive application of the Montana Environmental Policy Act.
Cabinet Resource Group v. Dept. of State Lands, No. 43914 (lst Jud. Dist., Sept. 29, 1982) (Denying
Motion for Summary Judgment); cf., Borough of Moosic v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 429
A.2d 1237, 1240 (Pa. 1981) (State Constitution does not require EIS preparation); Rudder v. Wise
County Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 249 S.E.2d 177, 180 (Va. 1978) (same).
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courts looked to these state cases for precedent, preserving a stricter state
rule in that state's jurisprudence.
But, by far, the most important factor has been the state courts'
treatment of the policies of their state acts. While federal courts were
holding that the policies of NEPA provided only national goals, 68 state
courts were finding precedent in SEPA policies for primafacie compliance
with the SEPA in all cases, consideration of environmental factors on the
record in all cases, and broad substantive application of the SEPA's
requirements.
The substantive applications of SEPA have not reached their high
water mark. The limits of the substantive application of SEPA will likely
be reached as plaintiffs begin to argue that an agency's decision to approve
or undertake a project violated the substantive policies of SEPA, or were
otherwise ultra vires or arbitrary and capricious in light of those policies.
The exact boundaries of SEPA's substantive effect are difficult to predict.
The trends in the case law seem to indicate that, when significant
environmental effects are identified but no measures are taken to minimize
or avoid them, the courts will require an agency to satisfactorily justify, on
the record before it, why the project was approved or undertaken in the face
of these impacts.169 Some states will follow Minnesota and invalidate such
decisions.170
This all reflects a trend, among the states which have SEPA, toward
stronger measures to protect the environment. Since SEPA can be used to
identify and correct environmental problems which do not fall under the
more specific provisions of clean air, water, and solid waste laws and used to
prospectively identify and correct environmental pollution which may
occur in spite of the provisions of more specific pollution control acts, they
are likely to remain in the forefront of that trend. 17
Whether or not any of this comes to pass, it is apparent that there is
now a body of state law, different from federal law, interpreting and
applying SEPA. The leading authorities in this body of law appear to be the
courts of Washington, California, and New York. The SEPA's of these
three states are typical of SEPA's across the United States. State courts
are looking to these states for persuasive authority and finding it. As this
trend continues, state environmental policy acts are likely to continue to
168. See supra note 143.
169. See supra notes 153-57.
170. See supra note 163.
171. State constitutional provisions regarding the environment can affect agency discretion.
How and why this happens is beyond the scope of this article.
Interested readers would do well by looking to, Tobias & McLean, Of Crabbed Interpretations and
FrustratedMandates. The Effect of Environmental PolicyActs on Pre-existingAgency Authority, 41
MoNT. L. REV. 177 (1980); Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193.
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develop and provide broader environmental protection than is found at the
federal level.
